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Abstract
When the interests of interlocutors are not aligned, either party
may wish to avoid truthful disclosure. A sender wishing to
conceal the truth from a receiver may lie by providing false
information, mislead by actively encouraging the receiver to
reach a false conclusion, or simply be uninformative by provid-
ing little or no relevant information. Lying entails moral and
other hazards, such as detection and its consequences, and is
thus often avoided. We focus here on the latter two strategies,
arguably more pernicious and prevalent, but not without their
own drawbacks. We argue and show in two studies that when
choosing between these options, senders consider the level of
suspicion likely to be exercised on the part of the receiver and
how much truth must be revealed in order to mislead. Extend-
ing Bayesian models of cooperative communication to include
higher level inference regarding the helpfulness of the sender
leads to insight into the strategies employed in non-cooperative
contexts.
Keywords: deception; Inductive inference; communication;
pragmatics
Introduction
“You can tell he’s lying because his lips are moving.”
If only detecting lies were that simple! Despite its impor-
tance, people generally perform at chance when classifying
liars and truth tellers (C. Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Indeed,
most verbal and nonverbal cues have only marginal diagnos-
tic value (DePaulo et al., 2003). Instead of focusing on cues
to deception, a promising new approach considers how the
cognitive processes involved in deception may differ from
telling the truth. It has been suggested, for example, that de-
ception imposes higher cognitive demands on liars, who may
find it more difficult to furnish details when interviewed (Vrij
& Granhag, 2012). A good understanding of the cognitive
mechanisms underlying deception, taking into account the
complexities of the strategies employed, would be a tremen-
dous asset (G. D. Bond, 2012; Blandon-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip,
& Yoo, 2014).
In the present research we analyse the challenge faced by
would-be deceivers seeking to conceal the truth. We begin
with a brief analysis of the deceiver’s perspective, identifying
the main deceptive strategies, and outline a preliminary study
which illustrates people’s preferences for these strategies. We
then present two studies where we ask people to conceal the
truth, manipulating the level of suspicion of the hypothetical
receiver and the information content of the available message
options.
How to deceive in ten steps (with pictures)
Communication relies on principles of cooperation (Grice,
1989). The intended meaning of a sender rarely coincides
perfectly with the “literal” content of a message, but by mak-
ing assumptions about why the sender chose that particular
message, the receiver may infer the intended meaning. By
assuming that a sender is cooperative and produces messages
that follow the Gricean maxims (described below), a receiver
can increase the speed and strength of the inferences they
draw from those messages (Horn, 2004).
But what if the sender is not trying to be cooperative? In
that case, there are three main strategies the sender can rely
on, each corresponding to different violations of the Gricean
maxims. Consider the following scenario: You shot your
neighbour’s hamster with your shotgun while she was away
for the weekend. Obviously, you’d prefer that she didn’t learn
the truth. However, you were given the key to her house to
take care of her pet, so you are definitely a person of interest
in her investigation. How can you conceal the truth from her?
• Lying: You might try an outright lie: “I did not shoot your ham-
ster”. Lying involves communicating a proposition to the receiver
with the full knowledge that it is false. From a Gricean perspec-
tive, lying is a violation of the supermaxim of quality, stating that
your contribution should be true.
• Being uninformative: It seems very sensible to be uninforma-
tive. Neighbour: “Did you shoot my hamster?” You:“Have you
heard the new Justin Bieber album? It’s fantastic!”1 With this
kind of utterance, it would seem that the receiver can infer noth-
ing beyond her prior beliefs. But this violates the Gricean maxims
of relevance and quantity, and these violations can themselves be
informative about the sender’s intentions even if not the actual
facts of the matter.
• Misleading: A third option is to mislead your neighbour by im-
plicature. “I was not at home when your hamster was shot!” You
tell her a truth very relevant to the issue at hand, but from which
you believe a false conclusion will be drawn (you were not at
home when you shot the hamster; you took it with you to a nearby
park for target practice). Misleading involves covertly violating
the maxims of quantity, but may be harder to detect.
1Admittedly, this could well be considered a bald-faced lie.
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In a preliminary study, we asked 96 first year psychology
students (87 women) at the University of Leuven to imagine
seven different scenarios like the following:
A man arrives home after a weekend in Vegas, during which
he won $2000 playing Poker, but lost $500 at the slot ma-
chines and $4000 on Blackjack. When he returns, he does
not know how to tell his wife. His wife knows that he has had
gambling problems in the past, but is convinced that they are
resolved. Their relationship is currently strained, so the man
would rather not cause any additional problems. His wife asks
him directly if he has gambled. Which of these answers would
you give if you were in his situation?
Participants selected a response from seven options com-
prised of two lies (e.g. “I didn’t gamble”), two uninformative
statements (e.g. “there were a lot of people gambling”), two
misleading statements (e.g. “I won $2000 playing Poker”),
and the truth. Figure 1 presents the preference of the par-
ticipants (collapsed across scenarios and equivalent response
options).
Figure 1: When choosing how to communicate in a variety of differ-
ent scenarios with a clear motivation to deceive, participants showed
a strong tendency to mislead rather than be uninformative.
Two important conclusions emerge from Figure 1. Firstly,
people were uncomfortable with deception: 37% of responses
involved telling the full truth and only 10% were outright lies:
a surprising number perhaps given that each scenario pro-
vided a clear motivation to deceive. However, this finding
is consistent with previous research showing that in general
people avoid lying through concerns regarding self-image,
guilt, and anxiety (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Of more relevance
to our present purposes, we found that among those who
chose not to tell the truth, people showed a clear preference
for misleading over lying or being uninformative (37%, 10%
and 15% respectively). This finding is consistent with earlier
work on the topic (Montague, Navarro, Perfors, Warner, &
Shafto, 2011; Rogers, Zeckhauser, Gino, Schweitzer, & Nor-
ton, 2014).
Balancing suspicion and information
So, why do people seem to prefer to actively mislead rather
than be entirely uninformative? At first glance, it seems ra-
tional to be as uninformative as possible: the receiver cannot
revise her beliefs on the basis of your utterances. Mislead-
ing on the other hand, involves salting your statements with a
grain of truth – something which the receiver may build upon
to infer the whole truth.
An important motivation for choosing a misleading utter-
ance over a strictly uninformative one is because the latter
raises suspicion. Consider the likely response of choosing to
be uninformative, as in the Las Vegas scenario:
Spouse: Did you gamble?
Gambler: Where shall we go for dinner? I’m hungry.
Spouse: You lost money didn’t you?
Gambler: Some of the guys won big.
Spouse: How much did you lose?
As Sperber et al. (2010) points out, people have a toolbox
of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance that reduce
the risk of being deceived. One such tool supports tracking
the cooperation of others; as a result, obvious departures from
that cooperation are noted (e.g., Mills, 2013). Responding in
an uninformative way violates the principle of cooperation so
blatantly that the deception is revealed.
A deceiver, sensitive to the epistemic vigilance of his coun-
terpart may prefer instead to provide truthful but misleading
utterances, but in doing so faces a delicate trade-off. Cho-
sen well, such utterances may not only allay the receiver’s
suspicion, but by virtue of the inferential boost accorded to
cooperative speakers, the receiver may be led to a false con-
clusion, terminating the search for further information. Yet if
suspicion is already raised, the receiver is unlikely to fall for
the false implicature, which relies on her assumption of co-
operation (Dynel, 2011), and may use the information to get
closer to the truth.
This analysis points to two opposite forces, balanced in
the selection of one strategy over another. On one hand, the
knowledge that the receiver may engage in inference about
the helpfulness of the statement may lead the sender to opt for
a misleading yet informative statement. On the other hand, if
the sender considers that the receiver will be suspicious a pri-
ori, he may resort to being uninformative. We examine these
factors in two experiments.
Experiment 1: The deception game
As the basis for our empirical investigation, we use a simple
two person communication game in which the interests of the
sender and receiver are opposed. In the game, the sender (cast
in the role of a pirate) and the receiver (cast as an explorer)
see four alternative maps, only one of which is genuine. Each
map purports to show the true extent of a contiguous region
where treasure is buried. The pirate, who knows the identity
of the genuine map and must seek to protect it, is required to
provide a hint to the explorer in the form of a small number of
locations that lie within the region. The explorer must use this
information to guess the identity of the genuine map. Both
players know that lying is not allowed; so the pirate can only
reveal locations where treasure is actually buried.
An example trial faced by participants, who took the role
of the pirate in this experiment, is shown in Figure 2. Figure
2(a) illustrates the four maps shown to the pirate and (hypo-
thetical) explorer for an example trial. In providing a hint
to the explorer, participants were restricted in their choice to
one of three kinds of hints : one uninformative, one mislead-
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(a) Four maps provided to the pirate and explorer.
(b) The pirate chooses one of three hints.
Figure 2: Experiment 1: The deception game.(a) Both the pirate
and explorer see the same four maps; the shaded area marks the
region where treasure be buried. Only one of the four maps is gen-
uine: the pirate seeks to conceal its identity, the explorer seeks to
discover it. (b) The pirate must provide a hint to the explorer, and is
given three hints from which to choose: a MISLEADING, UNINFOR-
MATIVE, or HELPFUL hint. Each hint marks a subset of locations
where treasure is buried (blue dots). Since lying is not permitted all
marked points lie within the shaded area when overlaid on the gen-
uine map. The hints vary in their potential to drive inference. The
MISLEADING hint appears to clearly point out the wrong map, de-
spite being consistent with all of them. The UNINFORMATIVE hint
neither points to nor excludes any of the maps. The HELPFUL hint
excludes all of the maps except the genuine one.
ing, and one genuinely helpful. Figure 2(b) shows examples
of the three options, and illustrates the likely effect that each
hint would have on the inference of a trusting explorer.
The informativeness of a hint was manipulated by varying
the number of treasure maps (out of four) that were excluded
by the hint. When maximally informative (HELPFUL), a hint
excludes all treasure maps, except the true one (bottom row of
Figure 2b). When maximally UNINFORMATIVE, it excludes
no treasure maps (middle row). The MISLEADING hints were
designed to closely resemble one of the three false maps (top
row), and to exclude none (as in the example shown), one or
two of the treasure maps.
People’s beliefs about the suspicion level of the receiver
(the hypothetical explorer) were manipulated by changing the
proportion of deceivers in the population that were suppos-
edly providing information. Participants were told that they
were part of a crew of six sailors providing a hint to the ex-
plorer. Participants were also told that the explorer knew that
the hint came from an unknown (but randomly selected) crew
member and knew the proportion of deceptive crew members.
Varying the number of deceivers in the crew from one to five
was intended to raise the perceived suspicion level of the ex-
plorer. Our question was whether the pirate would track and
use this information when providing hints, being more likely
to mislead when the suspicion level was lower. When facing
a trusting receiver, we expect people to be more inclined to
mislead, provided that the amount of information disclosed is
acceptable. But if the receiver is likely to be suspicious or too
much information would otherwise be revealed, we expect
people to be uninformative.
Participants were 120 undergraduates from the University
of Leuven (86% female, ages 18-24, median 18) participating
for course credit. Participants faced 30 trials in all: six sets
of four maps were presented in conjunction with each of five
crew configurations.
Results and discussion
Our first question was whether people’s decision to mislead
or not depended on how much information the misleading
option gave away. To address this, we examined whether
the proportion of participants choosing each kind of hint de-
pended on the number of treasure maps that were excluded
by the MISLEADING one. A chi-square test confirmed the
dependency shown in Figure 3 (χ2(4,3600) = 93.31, p <
0.001): as the amount of information revealed by the MIS-
LEADING hint increased, people were less willing to select
it, preferring instead to choose the UNINFORMATIVE option.
Indeed, in contrast to the pilot data in Figure 1, the UNIN-
FORMATIVE option was the most favoured in this task. This
is unsurprising perhaps, since a hint that excludes even one of
four maps is extremely informative.
Figure 3: Experiment 1: Informativeness. The y-axis shows the
number of times each type of hint (given by column label) was se-
lected as a function of the number of treasure maps excluded by the
misleading hint (x-axis): 0% means none were excluded, 25% means
one was, and 50% means that two were. People were sensitive to
informativeness: when the misleading hint was more informative,
people were less likely to mislead.
Our second question was whether people’s decision was
affected by their estimate of how suspicious the receiver (the
hypothetical explorer) was likely to be. In light of this, we
examined the relationship between participants’ choice of
hints and the number of deceptive crew members providing
hints for the explorer. Curiously, as Figure 4 illustrates, there
was no evidence for a relation between the level of suspicion
and the type of hint selected (χ2(8,3600) = 12.96, p= 0.11).
Even when people knew that the explorer thought that five
out of the six possible senders was acting deceptively, they
did not alter their selection of hints.
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Figure 4: Experiment 1: Suspiciousness. The y-axis shows the
number of times each type of hint (given by column label) was se-
lected as a function of the implied suspicion level of the explorer.
The numbers on the x-axis represent the number of deceptive mem-
bers in the crew that provides the explorer with a hint (more mem-
bers suggests that the explorer should be more suspicious). There
was no dependency between choice of hint and number of deceptive
crew members.
Experiment 2: Increasing suspicion
Experiment 1 found convincing evidence for the influence of
informativeness on the decision to mislead. If too much in-
formation would be revealed with a true but misleading state-
ment, people are more inclined to be uninformative. Surpris-
ingly, we did not find an effect of suspicion. What might be
going on here?
One possible explanation is simply that our manipulation
was ineffective. Perhaps changing the number of deceptive
crew members was not salient enough or required too much
effort for participants to interpret or keep in mind.
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, but rather than
have people infer how suspicious the explorer might be from
the composition of the crew, we instead gave participants ex-
plicit information about the explorer’s beliefs. In the LOW
SUSPICION condition, participants were told that the explorer
suspected that the hint came from a teammate, whereas in
the HIGH SUSPICION the explorer suspected the hint came
from an opponent. The experiment was similar in all other
respects except for a control condition in which participants
were asked to help the explorer (used to identify participants
who were not trying or did not understand the task). There
were also a number of filler items in which there was no ob-
viously misleading option.
Participants were 98 adults recruited via Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk and paid $1.25USD for 15 minutes participation.
Data from 22 participants who failed to demonstrate a suffi-
cient understanding of the experiment were excluded from
subsequent analysis.2 The remaining 76 participants were
46% female and aged 20-63 (median age 28.5). Participants
faced 30 trials in all: 10 map sets (six experimental, four
fillers) were presented in each of the three condition blocks.
2These exclusions were of participants who failed to select the
HELPFUL message in a CONTROL condition (where the goal was to
help) on at least 40% of trials. We also excluded those who selected
the HELPFUL message in the LOW SUSPICION condition on 40% or
more trials (where the goal was to hinder, and double bluffing was
unreasonable). There was no difference in the significance of our
findings if these people were included..
Figure 5: Experiment 2: Informativeness. The y-axis shows the
number of times each type of hint (given by column label) was se-
lected as a function of the number of treasure maps excluded by the
misleading hint (x-axis). As in Experiment 1, people were sensitive
to informativeness: when the misleading hint was more informative,
people were less likely to mislead. Data from the control condition
are excluded.
Figure 6: Experiment 2: Suspiciousness. The y-axis shows the
number of times each type of hint (given by the column label) was
selected as a function of the implied suspicion level of the explorer.
The x-axis reflects whether people were told that the explorer was
expecting a hint from a member of another team (the HIGH SUSPI-
CION condition) or from a teammate (the LOW SUSPICION condi-
tion). When participants knew that the explorer was apt to be sus-
picious of them, they were less inclined to be misleading, opting
instead to be uninformative.
Results and discussion
As before, our first question was whether people were sensi-
tive to informativeness when choosing which hint to provide.
Once again, there was a significant effect of informativeness
(χ2(4,912) = 18.04, p= 0.001). As Figure 5 shows, the more
maps the misleading option excluded, the less inclined people
were to select it, favouring instead the uninformative option.
In light of the null effect in Experiment 1, a perhaps more
interesting question is whether people were sensitive to the
suspicion level of the explorer when deciding what to tell
them. As Figure 6 reflects, when the suspicion level of the ex-
plorer is made more obvious, people are indeed sensitive to it.
Although the UNINFORMATIVE hint was still the most pop-
ular overall, the MISLEADING option was chosen far more
when the explorer was expecting a hint from a trusted team-
mate (χ2(2,912) = 85.95, p< 0.001). This suggests that peo-
ple acting as senders are indeed attentive to the level of trust
presumed by the receiver; although, taken together with the
results from Experiment 1, tracking suspicion may be too
cognitively challenging where it is not especially salient.
Towards a computational model
Experiments 1 and 2 manipulated two important factors: the
information content of the messages that deceivers could
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choose and their beliefs about the degree of suspicion with
which their messages would be received. Taken together, our
results show that both factors were important considerations.
In this section we present a computational model whose goal
is to aid our understanding of these results and generate new
testable predictions. While an in-depth analysis of the model
is beyond the scope of this paper, here we briefly describe the
relevant features.
A convenient starting point for a model of the deception
game employed here – and for communication in general –
is rational inference (e.g., Goodman & Frank, 2016). In this
framework, a receiver faces the challenge of updating her be-
liefs on the basis of information disclosed by a sender. The
sender, for his part, selects information designed (according
to his goal) to help or hinder the receiver in her efforts.
We first evaluate things from the perspective of the re-
ceiver, who is confronted with a hint x (or, more generally,
an utterance). The receiver is assumed to update her beliefs h
according to:
PRECEIVER(h |x) ∝ ∑
s∈S
PSENDER(x |h,s)P(h)P(s) (1)
where s represents a sampling strategy employed by the
sender and S represents the range of such strategies consid-
ered. As a simplifying assumption, we assume that the re-
ceiver considers the sender’s sampling strategy to be inde-
pendent of the true hypothesis.
This inference thus depends on the sender, who selects in-
formation according to a sampling strategy:
PSENDER(x |h) ∝ (PRECEIVER(h |x))α (2)
where α reflects the goals of the sender, and PRECEIVER(h|x)
the sender’s assumptions about how the receiver updates her
beliefs. A sender who wishes to reveal the truth to the re-
ceiver (i.e., to increase the receiver’s posterior probability for
the correct hypothesis h) will have an α with a positive value;
one who wishes to conceal the truth has a negative α; one
who behaves somewhat randomly has an α = 0. There are
other ways to capture conflicting goals, like assigning sepa-
rate utility functions for the sender and receiver with regard
to truth-predicated action, but we chose this for its relative
simplicity.
To capture the patterns observed in our deception game,
both equations have to be considered simultaneously. That
is, both sender and receiver must recursively consider the
assumptions and strategies used by the other party. Impor-
tantly, from the receiver’s perspective the inferential potential
of a message depends not only on the information as such,
but also on the “sampling strategy” of the sender, which re-
flects the sender’s goals and assumptions about the receiver.
For example, sampling procedures that follow the principle of
cooperation and the Gricean maxims have a stronger inferen-
tial potential (e.g., Bergstrom, Moehlmann, & Boyer, 2006;
Shafto, Goodman, & Griffiths, 2014; Voorspoels, Navarro,
Perfors, Ransom, & Storms, 2015). Crucially, the receiver
Figure 7: Model predictions for sender actions. Model predic-
tions for the preference of a sender in the deception game for the
misleading, uninformative and helpful message options. From left
to right, the panels present scenarios with increasingly suspicious
receivers (modelled through different kinds of inference about the
sender’s goals and assumptions). The x-axes indicate how informa-
tive the misleading option is (in terms of the proportion of hypothe-
ses excluded by it). The model predicts a decrease in preference
for the misleading option as it becomes increasingly informative, as
well as an increase in preference for misleading when the receiver is
less suspicious.
not only updates her beliefs about what is true, but simulta-
neously makes inferences about the sender’s sampling strat-
egy: learning whether the sender is helpful and knowledge-
able play a critical role in epistemic vigilance, and has a sub-
stantial impact on how rational agents reason (e.g., Shafto,
Eaves, Navarro, & Perfors, 2012).
In Equations (1) and (2), the universe of sampling strate-
gies S evaluated by the receiver is defined in terms of two
things that she presumes about the sender: what does the
sender assume about her (reflected by PRECEIVER(h|x)), and
what are his goals (reflected in α). Many scenarios may be
modelled in this way, but here we consider three. If the re-
ceiver is TRUSTING, this means that she is performing infer-
ence over two possibilities: either the sender is trying to be
helpful (α= 1), or he is inattentive and thus not selecting in-
formation with care (α= 0). If the receiver is UNTRUSTING,
this means that she believes that the sender is trying to con-
ceal the truth from her (α=−1), under the mistaken assump-
tion that he is trusted. Lastly, if the receiver is SUSPICIOUS,
this means that she is performing inference over whether to
be trusting or untrusting.
How well does this approach capture the main qualitative
patterns in the deception game? To answer this, we simu-
late outcomes for the three scenarios we have outlined. In the
leftmost panel of Figure 7, the receiver trusts the sender, but
is not sure how attentive he is: he may be acting helpfully
(α = 1) or he may be providing poor but not actively mis-
leading data, perhaps due to lack of motivation, attention, or
information (α= 0).
If the receiver updates her beliefs (concerning the true trea-
sure map) at the same time as her assumptions about the help-
fulness of the information received (α) then there is reason
for the sender to choose a hint that seems informative. That
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the message appears informative supports the receiver’s as-
sumption that it has been carefully selected, which further
fuels inference. This recursive process may lead the receiver
to draw a misleading conclusion if the sender is not actually
helpful (as in our experiments). However, as the information
content of the hint increases, so too does the risk that the re-
ceiver will inadvertently arrive at the truth. Consequently, the
model captures the fact that the sender’s preference for the
misleading hint declines with its information content.
In the rightmost panel of Figure 7, in contrast, the receiver
is certain that the sender is not to be trusted. If the sender is
aware of this, there is little to be gained by attempting to mis-
lead, and so the uninformative hint is preferred. The extent of
this preference is, once again, moderated by the information
content of the misleading option.
In many situations, a receiver will not be predisposed to
regard the sender with complete trust, nor complete distrust,
but rather will remain open to either possibility. We model
this case by assuming that the receiver is performing infer-
ence about whether the sender should be trusted (α= 1 or 0)
or not (α = −1). The preferences of an antagonistic sender
facing a Suspicious receiver are shown in the center panel of
Figure 7. The two conflicting forces are most pronounced
here, dividing the sender’s preference between the two strate-
gies. On the one hand, the sender may convince the receiver
that he is actually trying to help by appearing informative, yet
the (real) information can be used by the receiver to rule out
previously plausible (but false) hypotheses.
Overall, there are two clear patterns that were found in our
experiments and were also predicted by our model. Firstly, as
the information content of the misleading option increases,
there is an increasing preference for choosing the uninforma-
tive hint. Secondly, the more trusting the receiver is assumed
to be, the more popular the misleading option becomes. This
pattern of results is consistent with the idea that people may
be performing some kind of recursive inference over how sus-
picious their interlocutor is when deciding how to deceive.
Furthermore, our results are consistent with the notion posited
here and elsewhere (e.g., Goodman & Frank, 2016; Shafto
et al., 2012), that receivers (from the sender’s perspective at
least) perform joint inference over the goals of the sender and
the truth of the matter at hand given the information received.
Conclusion
“There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact.”
— Arthur Conan Doyle
In two studies we have demonstrated that people’s preference
for a deceptive strategy hinges on their assumption of whether
cooperative norms are expected to apply. In situations where
high levels of trust and cooperation are warranted, deceivers
are more inclined to actively mislead than to simply withhold
information. In this scenario, the deceiver seeks to leverage
the inferential boost of cooperative communication. In con-
trast, when the deceiver believes the false implication will not
be inferred — when the receiver is already suspicious — then
preference shifts towards limiting the information disclosed.
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